The international disparities in health and health-care provision comprise the gravest problem ofmedical ethics. The implications are explored ofthree theories ofjustice: an expanded version ofRawlsian contractarianism, Nozick's historical account, and a consequentialism which prioritises the satisfaction of basic needs. The second too little satisfies medical needs to be cogent. The third isfound to incorporate the strengths ofthe others, and to upholdfair rules and practices. Like the first, it also involves obligations transcending those to an agents relations and fellow-citizens. These conclusions are applied to international health-care provision, which they would transform.
Introduction
There has been a salutory increase of late in the study of medical ethics, and many philosophers have been applying their skills to themes such as informed consent, in vitro fertilisation and choices between lives in matters such as the allocation of kidney machines. This study has probably already been of assistance to individual physicians and health administrators, and, even if it has seldom been of assistance to national governments, this has not been the fault of the philosophers.
Much less, however, has been heard about international priorities in health care, and this despite the well known disparities between facilities in the poorest countries and those in the more developed ones. This could be because, besides the staffofthe World Health Organisation, there are few professionals liable to be influenced by such reflection. Or it could be because problems which are difficult enough at local and national levels seem to become mind-boggling and intractable when writ large and considered in their international version. This journal in particular has carried little or nothing on international disparities of
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health and health care, to judge from its own recent thematic review of past issues (1) . Yet health and sickness know no boundaries, any more than morality and justice do; and it is high time for some ofthe global aspects of medical ethics to be explored as well as more circumscribed and familiar issues. Indeed the task of defending the tendency among medical ethicists to limit themselves to the problems of wealthier societies would be an unenviable one, were anyone bold enough to attempt it.
In this paper I shall therefore be investigating the requirements of justice in health care at an intersocietal and international level. The deficiency is, however, attended to by Brian Barry in The Liberal Theory ofJustice (4) . There it is urged that Rawls's contractors would select rules for international relations which would pre-empt the need for them to live in an underprivileged society, and which would provide, as far as possible, for basic needs to be met in general in every society. Without endorsing Rawls's fundamental but questionable assumption (the assumption that the rules which selfinterested but rational contracting parties choosing behind a veil of ignorance would select will be just ones) Barry the justifications of redistribution found in other theories of justice, and through its capacity to appeal without inconsistency to basic needs, consequentialism thus supplies a strong basis for tackling international obligations in the matter of health care, deserving thereby to receive a readier acknowledgement of its own intrinsic merits as a theory of obligation and of value (7).
Some implications
It follows that much more effort is called for, in the forms both of treatment and of prevention. More doctors and nurses, more hospitals and dispensaries are needed in much of the Third World; but also much more effort should be given to ensuring for people everywhere clean water, adequate sanitation, improved nutrition and the control ofpollution. These issues, indeed, interact with ones ofhealth care, and in at least two ways; for they are in many cases preconditions of improved health, and, there again, improved health prospects often form a necessary condition of the success of population policies, and thereby for progress in economic and social development in general.
But it does not follow that hospitals and health systems should be transplanted from the more developed countries to the less developed, either literally or as models. On the one hand the basic needs ofpeople in the former countries matter too; and on the other hand these institutions will not easily transplant, and will not function at all unless supplied with sufficient recurrent resources. Agents have to take account of the world as it is; and only if large numbers of agents or if powerful agencies co-operate are the contexts and the limits of possible action likely to change. Until that happens the typical ethical problem confronting agents is how, while resources remain inadequate, to make the most difference to the ocean of unsatisfied basic needs; and at the same time how to foster self-help among the people concerned, so that the fruits of intervention are multiplied and development becomes self-perpetuating. If the likeliest way of achieving this is through training paramedicals and barefoot doctors (rather than for example through building modern hospitals) then that is how action should be shaped; and the same applies if the likeliest way consists in supporting a new and more just social order, and leaving the citizens of that order to confront their health problems without further intervention.
Yet health care is an international project in more ways than this would suggest, and concerns more than the bilateral relations of any pair of countries. Infectious diseases are an international and sometimes a global threat; while much medical research is and perhaps must be of an international character. (This applies also to research into the sociology of medicine, and the study of, for example, why doctors all over the world prefer on average to ply their trade in cities rather than in the countryside, and of how, in face of such problems, to provide for rural health care.) In such matters, whatever the merits of self-help and local autonomy, collaborative effort is often vital, as well as being in the interest of each and every country; and, even if a creaking international bureaucracy must be endured, each of them has an obligation to take part in one way or another. International divisions, barriers and hostilities obviously inhibit and sometimes prevent such collaboration; but this is but one of the many reasons for eroding them.
How obligations 'to our own people' can be overridden So far, the activities delineated may suggest that greater effort on the part of (and support for the efforts of) international organisations such as WHO and charities such as Oxfam is the greater part of what theories of justice call for, if supplemented with some amount ofaid from the governments ofthe more developed countries. But this is to ignore some of the ethical dilemmas facing both individuals and governments. For where the same outlay ofeffort or resources would make more difference to the satisfaction of basic needs if directed to a poor country rather than to one's own rich country, consequentialism apparently calls for it to be directed to the former; and this holds good of the agency of governments as well as of individuals.
Now it is widely held that the first duty of either an individual or a government is to assist one's own family, district or country; and indeed if everyone belonged to a family, district or country where concerted action was viable and enough people assisted their relations or their fellow-citizens, there would be much less call than there is for assistance to strangers and aliens. Indeed this is, perhaps, enough to justify effort to provide for one's family, at least as far as the satisfaction of basic needs is concerned. But the world is such that in some countries concerted action, for example in matters of health care, is not viable, whether because of famine, poverty or corruption; and that, for these or other reasons, not enough local people are capable of showing solidarity with one another. But this suffices to bring out fatal defects in the view that agents may quite generally give priority to their own family, district or country.
Admittedly the pressures on agents will often be such that giving priority to the basic needs (health care needs included) of faraway people is out of the question. But often it is not. There are governments which would have the support of a sufficient proportion of their electorate to be able to dedicate at least one per cent of gross national product to aid Third World countries, or to negotiate better terms for these countries in international trade or (for example, through participation in the counsels of the IMF or the World Bank) in negotiations to re-schedule international debt. And the resulting changes could make enough difference to satisfy unsatisfied health needs on an enormous scale. These governments lack the excuse of inability to act, and should accordingly do as justice demands, as many individuals and many voluntary organisations (such as churches) do already, and many more individuals and organisations should also do.
For some medically qualified individuals, then, this could well mean practising in the Third World, where the need is great, rather than in the West, where the need is sometimes less great. For others, granted their situation, abilities and the medical needs of their own community it would not mean this, but it would mean reviewing intelligently their own sphere of operations from time to time to discover where, in the circumstances, most difference can be made.
The inescapability of commitment
Those who reject the kind of consequentialism advocated above might be thought to be under no obligation to adopt these conclusions, and free, perhaps, to regard medical ethics as limited to individual and intrasocial dilemmas rather than to the problems which I have been discussing. Yet any theory which recognises the importance of the satisfaction of needs, whether consequentialist or not, is likely to generate the same conclusions; and, there again, any contractarianism which does not insist that the contract is a purely local one is likely to yield them too, as has been seen. Only a theory restricted to the defence of current entitlements and liberties is likely to be able to resist these conclusions; but such theories diverge so far from the widespread moral beliefs of humanity both about right and wrong and about justice that theorists who defend them risk loss of credibility and governments resort to them at their peril.
Thus any credible account ofobligations or ofjustice upholds the above implications for action, which apply to agents and agencies able to make a difference whether they recognise all this or not.
Conclusion
I have argued for the relevance of medical ethics to international and intersocietal issues, and maintained that the most plausible normative theory, a kind of consequentialism, and indeed other normative theories besides, generate far-reaching obligations with regard to meeting the unsatisfied basic health care needs of people in poor countries. Given these obligations, there are far-reaching practical implications for governments, for international bodies, for companies (which often have the power of international bodies), for voluntary organisations, and for individuals. In addition there are special implicit obligations for medical ethicists to ensure that the international aspects of medical ethics are in future much more extensively pursued, and that the practical implications are much more explicitly drawn and publicised (8 
